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Abstract
Kazakhstan possesses extensive natural resources reserves that are expected to yield significant
export revenues. Since Kazakhstan’s attaining independence in 1991, the composition of exports has
changed in favor of energy-related sectors. In the context of such evidence and considerable
expected future revenues, many researchers have pointed to the Dutch Disease question. This paper
examines whether Kazakhstan is vulnerable to this condition. Using an extended version of the
Balassa-Samuelson model including a terms-of-trade effect, we find evidence that changes in the
terms of trade had a significant effect on the real exchange rate after 1996, providing evidence of the
Dutch Disease.
Keywords: Dutch Disease, transition, oil, terms of trade, Kazakhstan.3
1.  INTRODUCTION
Kazakhstan possesses extensive reserves natural resources and is heavily reliant on revenues
from the export of primary commodities, in particular petroleum and natural gas. Between 1995 and
2000, the percentage contribution of fuel and oil products to overall exports rose from 23.8% to
52.8%, while the share of the second most important sector, ferrous metallurgy, declined from above
19% in 1995 to 12.9% in 2000 [Kazakstan Economic Trends (KET), 2001]. At the same time, the oil
and gas sector has attracted a considerable amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the
economy. Based on 1999 figures, the sector’s share in total FDI was about 85%, while ferrous and
non-ferrous metals attracted only 3.83% of total FDI in that year [International Monetary Fund
(IMF), 2001)]. The oil and gas industry has also been an important source of tax revenues for the
national government. Taxes paid by this sector represented 43.7% of total tax payments in the first
five months of 2000. By way of comparison, ferrous metallurgy contributed 26.8% of total tax
payments. It is expected that the oil industry will continue to play a large role in the economy in the
future.
The economy’s dependence on revenues from the oil and commodity exporting sectors,
which will remain high in the foreseeable future, is likely to make the economy vulnerable to external
commodity price fluctuations and, possibly, “Dutch Disease” effects. This question arises not only in
the context of future revenues, but also with respect to an analysis of the current situation, namely,
structural changes in favor of the resource sector and a real appreciation of the currency. Studying
whether such factors are typical indicators of the transition to a market economy or they instead
signal a vulnerability to the Dutch Disease is an important issue for Kazakhstan and its future
prosperity. In this paper, we shed light on these issues by investigating empirically the validity of the
Dutch Disease effects. To anticipate our results, empirical findings suggest evidence for the Dutch
Disease during the post-1996 period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic
model of the Dutch Disease problem as presented in the classic theoretical literature. Section 3
briefly discusses whether the Dutch Disease is a big problem in practice. Motivated by the fact that
the government is the main recipient of oil and gas export revenues, Section 4 provides a discussion
of the government’s spending of mineral resource revenues. Section 5 describes the past and current
macroeconomic situation in Kazakhstan and discusses the implications of the country’s resource-
based development strategy. Section 6 explains our empirical modeling of the real exchange rate and
reports our empirical results. We provide concluding remarks in Section 7.4
2. THE “CORE MODEL” OF THE DUTCH DISEASE
Many economies were faced with shocks as a result of the sharp increase in energy prices in
the 1970s. There is a huge body of literature that analyzes the impact of these shocks and the
consequences of the adjustment policies followed by various countries. It includes a significant
number of papers devoted to the Dutch Disease problem faced by resource-exporting countries (see,
e.g., Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; Rosenberg and Saavalianen, 1998). Oil-exporting
countries have experienced a significant increase in their national wealth due to higher oil prices,
resource discoveries, or technological progress in the energy sector. The booming demand caused by
higher wealth leads to shift of an economy’s productive resources from the tradeables sector to the
non-tradeables sector. Such shrinkage of the tradeables sector is known as the Dutch Disease,
referring to the supposedly adverse effects on Dutch manufacturing of that country’s natural gas
discoveries in the 1960s.
The analysis of the Dutch Disease is relevant not only for oil and gas-exporting countries, but
also for those producing any primary export commodity, as well as those experiencing sudden
massive capital inflows. As Corden (1984) suggests, Dutch Disease analysis is applicable to gold
discoveries in Australia, capital inflows to Switzerland, and the inflow of American gold to Spain in
the sixteenth century, among other cases.
Corden and Neary (1982) present the “core model” of Dutch Disease economics. In their
simplest static models, a resource boom affects the rest of the economy in two main ways: the
resource movement effect and the spending effect.
• The resource movement effect. The boom in the energy sector raises the marginal product of labor
in that sector, which causes a movement of labor from both the manufacturing and non-tradable
sectors to the booming sector. The result is a contraction of the tradable sector due to a reduction in
the application of production factors there.
• The spending effect. The boom in the natural resource sector, which may be caused by a rise in the
world price of the resource, leads to increased income in the country and, consequently, to increased
demand for both tradables and non-tradables. Since the prices of tradables are fixed internationally,
this effect leads to rising prices of non-tradables relative to tradables, that is, a real appreciation of
the exchange rate. This, in turn, leads to mobile factors moving from the tradables to the non-
tradables and resource sectors, that is, a contraction of the non-booming tradables sector.
Corden and Neary (1982) consider a small, open economy that comprises three sectors:
energy, a manufacturing or tradable sector, and a non-tradables or services sectors. They analyze
three static models, which are characterized by different assumptions about the factor mobility5
between sectors. In the first model, they assume that each sector uses one specific non-mobile factor
(capital) and one mobile factor (labor). They show that in this case both the resource movement
effect and the spending effect lead to labor leaving the manufacturing sector, resulting in a decline in
the output of that sector. The output in the booming sector increases since the boom occurs in that
sector. The change in the output of the non-tradables sector is ambiguous: although the spending
effect would lead to an expansion of this sector, the resource movement would cause it to contract.
The movement of labor from the manufacturing sector to the booming sector is called “direct de-
industrialization.” The flow of labor out of the non-tradable sector, together with the demand
increase for goods from that sector due to the spending effect, causes a further movement of labor
from the manufacturing sector to the non-tradable sector; this is called “indirect de-industrialization.”
The other two models described in the article are suitable for the medium-term analysis of the
Dutch Disease problem. In the first, it is assumed that capital is mobile between the manufacturing
and services sectors, while the second assumes that capital is mobile among all three sectors. In these
cases, the actual outcome of resource reallocation cannot be predicted without a detailed knowledge
of the parameter values of the models. If a booming sector does not use domestic factors of
production – that is, it is an “enclave” – the resource movement effect will not occur. This may be
the case for an oil boom in a Dutch Disease model. Since there is only a spending effect, the oil
boom would lead to a shrinking of the non-oil tradables sector and an expansion of the services (non-
tradables) sector.
2
3. IS THE DUTCH DISEASE A MAJOR PROBLEM IN PRACTICE?
A large literature investigates the relationship between a country’s natural resource
endowment and its economic development and growth. Many researchers report sharp differences in
the performance of resource-rich developing economies on the one hand and resource-deficient ones
on the other. Auty (1998b) discusses the poor performance of resource-abundant countries in terms
of both external and internal factors. There are three hypotheses related to the external impacts.
First, exports of primary products increase income inequality. Second, the non-booming tradable
sector becomes less competitive because of the Dutch Disease effect. Third, because the prices of
primary goods are more volatile than the prices of manufactured goods, a primary export orientation
can lead to periodic growth collapses.
An export boom involving primary goods operating via adverse effects on the manufacturing
sector, as predicted by the core model of the Dutch Disease, can also affect economic growth in the
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following way (van Wijnbergen, 1984). If most economic growth is caused by learning by doing,
which is mainly confined to the non-oil tradables sector, a temporary decline in that sector may lead
to lower productivity and therefore to lower national income in the future.
As for transition economies, some observers have expressed the opinion that resource
abundance is more likely to worsen the problems of the transition to a market economy than to
alleviate them. According to Auty (1998b), one of reasons for this is that resource rents support a
slow response to reforms, and a slow response means a higher risk of policy corruption. In other
words, for example, rents from natural resources provide a government with a basis for believing
that the gradualist transition is a more appropriate model than “big bang” reform. The second reason
why resource abundance may worsen the transition is that resource rents may make a government
excessively optimistic about future mineral revenues during contract negotiations and it may then
spend those revenues before they are available. In the absence of financial transparency, resource
revenues may be squandered. Meanwhile, if expected future production is not realized, the
government may face severe budget problems.
A resource-abundant transition economy country facing a Dutch Disease problem may
experience worsening problems during the transition period. Rosenberg and Saavalainen (1998)
examine the economic risks related to the extensive use of natural resources in a transition economy
and propose a policy strategy to deal with these risks in Azerbaijan. The standard Dutch Disease
model is modified so as to take into account certain peculiarities of transition economies:
undervaluation of the national currency, increases in capital inflows, and the underdevelopment of
the financial system. The first two “transition factors” will likely speed up the real appreciation of the
currency. Moreover, the non-oil tradables sectors may suffer mainly through transition-specific
structural problems rather than through a real appreciation of the currency. Rosenberg and
Saavalainen (1998) discuss strategies for government regulation of Azerbaijan’s economy in the
medium term; their discussion may be seen as a “blueprint“ for other transition economies dealing
with natural resource booms. In developing these strategies, the authors take into account the
experiences of Ecuador, Indonesia, and Nigeria in the 1970s. They argue that Azerbaijan can avoid
the Dutch Disease problem if it “promotes savings and open trade and strengthens the supply side
through structural policies.”
3
In contrast to the usual pessimistic views on the economic development of resource-rich
developing countries, Davis (1995) considers the top 43 mineral-producing developing countries
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according to a modified mineral dependence index. He compares the rankings for 1970 (prior to the
oil and gold price boom) and 1991 (after the booms had ended). Davis (1995) concludes that the
detrimental effects of the exploitation of natural resources for the long-term development of
resource-based developing countries are not widespread.
4. GOVERNMENT SPENDING OF MINERAL RESOURCE REVENUES
The government is typically the main recipient of mineral export revenues, whether through
direct sales, royalties, or taxes. Therefore, the question of how governments spend their portion of
resource revenues is of great interest.
The main use of export revenues in most of the relevant countries is public expenditures, and
in particular public investment. Gelb and Associates (1988) mention two kinds of investment of oil
boom revenues that states can make to strengthen the non-oil economy. The first is to invest in the
non-oil tradable sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing. The second is to emphasize the non-
tradables sectors, which include economic infrastructure (transport and communications) and social
infrastructure (education, housing, and health care). Further, they compare the composition of public
investment programs across six developing oil exporters – Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela – during 1970-1984. They find that the major part (on average
60-70%) of public investment spending by these exporters has been on physical and social
infrastructure. For instance, Ecuador allocated a high portion (more than 50%) of its public
investment to the construction of economic infrastructure (transport and communications). The only
exception was Algeria, which put more than 50% on average of its investment into industry, and only
38% into infrastructure, during 1970-1984.
The largest part of the remainder of government investment has been concentrated on
resource-based industries. Investment in infrastructure and resource industries varied in these
countries between 56 and 90% of total investment. The lowest figure was 56.2% during 1970-1973
period in Algeria, while the highest was 93.9% in Ecuador during 1979-1981.
At the same time, the number, size, and complexity of projects with capital costs of over
$100 million rose in these countries. At least 54% of these projects were in the area of resource-
based industries. Gelb and Associates (1988) cite data suggesting that larger projects have a greater
tendency to overrun initial estimated costs and time budgets than do smaller ones. In conclusion,
Gelb and Associates (1988) underline that the infrastructural bias of government spending did not
lead to income-generating activity. As a result, in case of future declines in oil incomes, fiscal
revenues will suffer and the economies may face recession.8
5. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF KAZAKHSTAN’S ECONOMY
5.1 Petroleum and Gas Orientation
Kazakhstan is the second largest petroleum producer in the CIS (after Russia), putting it in
the top 30 among the world’s 90 oil-producing countries. At the end of 1995, the country’s proven
reserves of oil and natural gas were 3 billion tons, while its projected reserves came to 7 billion tons
(Statisticheskoe obozrenie Kazakhstan, 1999). More broadly, Kazakhstan is among the world’s
leading countries with respect to its reserves of strategically important raw materials. “Average per
capita reserves of crude oil, coal, iron, chrome, manganese, the main non-ferrous metals and
phosphates exceed the world average. The country possesses the world’s largest reserves of
tungsten, zinc, and barium ores, the second largest reserves of lead, chrome ores, gold, silver and
phosphates, and the third largest reserves of copper. It also boasts the world’s fourth largest reserves
of manganese and molybdenum and the seventh largest reserves of iron ore and tin (Akhmetova,
Buranbaeva, and Radivilova, 1996). The importance of natural resources to Kazakhstan’s economy
is illustrated by the country’s export structure, as depicted in Table 1.
Between 1995 and 2000, the percentage contribution of fuel and oil products to overall
exports rose from 23.8% to 52.8%, while the share of ferrous metallurgy, the second most important
sector in the country, declined from above 19% to 12.9% [Kazakstan Economic Trends (KET),
2001]. Exports are likely to remain concentrated in a narrow range of commodity groups – fuel and
oil products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and inorganic chemicals. Production of both ferrous
and non-ferrous metals is highly export-oriented: some 70-90% of annual output and up to 90% of
copper and zinc are delivered to foreign markets. The export of copper, zinc, and ferrous metals was
re-oriented toward non-CIS markets in 1997 (KET, 1999). The export values of both ferrous and
non-ferrous products are highly dependent on the situation on foreign markets, so these exports will
fluctuate over time in accordance with external factors. Further growth of the output of these
products is possible only with considerable investment in the relevant sectors. Accordingly, the oil
sector, which attracted more than half of total FDI during 1993-1997 – compared with one-quarter
for other minerals – is likely to remain dominant for the foreseeable future (Auty, 1998a).
Moreover, the government expects that revenues from the exploitation of the country’s
hydrocarbon reserves will be able to finance much of the cost of overall economic development.
Such a resource-based strategy was established in a program called “Kazakhstan 2030” promulgated
by President Nursultan Nazarbaev. The roots of this strategy lie in the structure of the economy
inherited from the days of the Soviet Union, which was characterized by a high degree of regional9
specialization. Like other less developed union republics, Kazakhstan had an industrial structure
oriented toward the production and processing of raw materials; it also specialized in heavy
machinery and agriculture.
An important characteristic of the government’s resource-based development strategy is the
significant number of large investment projects that have been announced since the country’s
independence. These projects aim to expand Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon export transportation
capacity, because the insufficiency of such capacity is the most important obstacle to the
development of this sector. These pipelines aim to provide new export routes to world markets for
Kazakh oil and gas. Nowadays, the export of oil is possible only via Russia and the Caspian Sea.
There are (effectively limiting) quotas on transit through Russia, and export via the Caspian is
restricted by the capacity of existing terminals
If these planned pipelines become operational, export earnings will jump. In this case, in view
of growing export revenues, analysts frequently raise the question of the Dutch Disease problem that
Kazakhstan may face. This issue has been analyzed by IMF staff under three scenarios concerning
the future prospects for oil exports (IMF, 1998). These three scenarios are termed “optimistic,”
“central,” and “pessimistic,” and differ in their assumptions about the evolution of Kazakhstan’s oil
export capacity and of world oil prices.
According to the optimistic scenario (see Figure 1), oil export revenues as a percentage of
projected GDP jump from 6.1% in 1999 to 9.4% in 2000, to 12.4% in 2001, and 14.6% in 2006,
after which they converge to 12%, as GDP grows faster than oil export capacity. Under the central
scenario, oil export revenues increase from 5.5% of GDP in 1998 to 11% in 2001, thereafter
converging to 8%. According to the pessimistic scenario, oil export revenues initially decline until
2002, jumping thereafter by almost 2% to 6.4% in 2002, and in 2003 to 8.4%.
In comparison with other resource-rich developing countries, the oil export revenues of 12%
of GDP achieved under the optimistic scenario represent a larger windfall than Venezuela received
during 1974-1978 (10.8% of non-mining GDP) or 1979-1981 (8.7% of non-mining GDP) (Gelb and
Associates, 1988, p. 62). Even the Mexican oil windfall, estimated at a more modest 3.5% of non-oil
GDP during 1979-1981, brought about considerable effects suggestive of the Dutch Disease.
5.2 Recent Macroeconomic Performance
Output has fallen, albeit unevenly, across all industrial sectors since 1991. The most severe
decline in output was in 1994. The first signs of industrial stabilization appeared in 1995, when
positive output growth was observed in metallurgy due to increased export demand for the output of
this sector. Timber and wood processing, construction materials, and light industry all recorded10
sharp output declines, so that the traditional resource-based sectors recovered faster than the others
did (De Broeck and Kostial, 1998).
The transformational recession has been deeper in manufacturing than in resource-based
industries. This is illustrated by the fact that, while the share of industry and agriculture in gross
domestic product (GDP) shrank by one-third over 1993-1997, within the industrial sector mineral
production expanded its share in GDP during this period (IMF, 1998). Sectoral employment has also
experienced structural change. The share of total employment accounted for by industry and
construction fell from 25.6% to 18.3% between 1994 and 1997, while that of services rose from
52.9% to 57.7% over this period (Trud i zanyatost naseleniya v Respyblike Kazakhstan, 1998).
Despite an increase in exports from $3.2 billion in 1994 to $6.9 billion in 1997 (before
declining to $5.8 billion in 1998), the current account balance deteriorated from a surplus of $175
million in 1994 to a deficit of $794 million in 1997 or 3.7% of GDP (and $1.2 billion or 5.4% of
GDP) in 1998. The current account (and budget) deficits of 1994-1998 were accompanied by a
significant accumulation of internal and external debt. Since 1997, the gross foreign debt has
increased from $3.26 billion (30.7% of GDP and 88.7% of exports) in 1994 to $7.54 billion (34.9%
and 113.1%, respectively), in the first quarter of 1999.
The tenge appreciated (see Figure 2) against the U.S. dollar in real terms from mid-1994
through 1998. With respect to the Russian ruble, there has been a similar tendency for the real
exchange rate for almost the entire period. Although a real appreciation of the domestic currency is
considered one of the indicators of Dutch Disease problem, the transition from a planned to a market
economy is generally also associated with the same development. Halpern and Wyplosz (1996),
Orlowski (1997), Dibooglu and Kutan (2001), and De Broeck and Sløk (2001) indicate several
potential factors that contribute to an appreciation of the currency of a transition economy.
4
Between the last quarter of 1997 and March 1999, the defensive policy of the National Bank
of Kazakhstan (NBK) resulted in a loss of international reserves of about 40% or $600 million (IMF,
2001). By early 1998, output was growing, as it has been since mid-1996, annual inflation had fallen
to less than 10% and there were expectations that output growth would continue in 1998.
Unfortunately, Kazakhstan was affected by a series of large external shocks during the later part of
the year, including a decline in world primary commodity prices, financial turmoil in emerging
markets, the Russian financial crisis, and a severe drought. Only after being faced with the significant
loss of international reserves and the degradation in the country’s external competitiveness did
policymakers announce the introduction of a freely floating exchange rate regime (on April 4, 1999).
After several weeks of extreme volatility, which saw the tenge falling by 30.3% in April, 12.4% in11
May, and 2.5% in June, the nominal exchange rate finally stabilized at TKZ145/USD at the end of
1999, compared to the TKZ88/USD at the end of March 1998.
The external shocks, especially the fall in the world prices for the country’s major export
commodities (oil, metals, and grain) had a profound impact on economic growth. Real GDP fell by
2.5% in 1998. A fall in industrial output by 2.1% and a drop in agricultural output by 18.9%
accompanied the decline in real GDP. The fall in output continued into the first quarter of 1999. Real
GDP fell by 4% in the first quarter of 1999, relative to the same quarter of 1998.
Although after the switch to the floating exchange rate in April 1999, the tenge depreciated
substantially in real terms, by June 2000 the real exchange rate was about 20% above its level prior
to the Russian crisis (see Figure 2 for the operative definition of the real exchange rate). Moreover,
in real terms, the U.S. dollar and the Deutsche mark have recently been weaker against the tenge
than they were before the Russian crisis (IMF, 2001).
The switch to a freely floating exchange rate in April 1999, along with the increases in world
prices of primary commodities, has had positive impacts on the country’s economic development.
Starting in the third quarter of 1999, economic performance began to improve. Real GDP growth
reached 2.7% in 1999 and 3% in 2000. However, the main factor that caused the growth in the
economy of the country was the increase in the world prices of the major export commodities of
Kazakhstan, such as oil and metals.
Favorable external conditions continued in 2000 and contributed further to the stability of the
tenge in 2000. Throughout the year, the tenge depreciated steadily against the U.S. dollar in nominal
terms, so by the end of the year its value had decreased by 5.2%. In real terms, the tenge appreciated
against the U.S. dollar by 9.8%. The stability of the exchange rate was partly caused by stability of
the Russian ruble, whose devaluation rate was approximately equal to the devaluation rate of tenge
in nominal terms. At present, the monetary authorities are maintaining the floating exchange rate
regime adopted in April 1999. The NBK intervenes in the foreign exchange market exclusively for
the purposes of ensuring orderly market conditions and strengthening its international reserve
position.
In summary, the composition of trade has undergone a substantial change in Kazakhstan
since 1992. Some sectors of the economy like agriculture and manufacturing collapsed, while the
extractive sectors, mainly oil and gas, became dominant sectors in the economy (Table 1). The
current pattern of economic development of the country so far can be mainly characterized as
dominated by the oil and fuel export sector, strong real exchange rate, and hence increased
vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, and hence to the Dutch Disease problem. Such trends
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may negatively affect the economic growth in the future as well. It is therefore important to formally
test the vulnerability of the Kazakhstan’s economy to the Dutch Disease effects. We take up this
issues in the next section.
6. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
6.1 Estimated Equations
There are various theories that explain the movement of the real exchange rate during the
transition. One explanation for the movement of the real exchange rates relies on the Balassa -
Samuelson effect (Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997; De Broeck and Sløk, 2001). According to this effect,
productivity growth in the tradables sector leads to an increase in real wages. If wages are the same
in the various sectors of the economy, then wages and therefore prices should rise in the non-
tradables sector, affecting the real exchange rate. Orlowski (1997) finds that real exchange rate
movements in transition economies tend to be driven by high inflation rates, rising labor costs, and
trends in nominal exchange rates. Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) test Brada’s (1998) conjecture that
real exchange rates in transition economies should follow a path that reflects either the effects of real
shocks or those of monetary shocks. They find that both monetary and real shocks can explain
movements in the real exchange rates in transition economies.
De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) have extended the Balassa-Samuelson to include the terms of
trade (TOT). The inclusion of the TOT variable is very important in the context of the Dutch Disease
phenomenon. An increase in the price of oil, which will improve Kazakhstan’s terms of trade, implies
an increase in export revenues. This leads to an increase in spending on all goods, which raises
domestic prices relative to foreign prices, causing an increase in RER. We therefore propose to
employ the extended version of the Balassa-Samuelson model (which includes the TOT effect).
In general terms, this model can be specified as:
RER = f (TOT, P, RW) (1)
where RER, TOT, P, and RW are the real exchange rate, terms of trade, prices, and real wages,
respectively.
Equation 1 is also consistent with empirical evidence on the behavior of real exchange rates
in transition economies. The TOT variable is included in the model to test for the Dutch Disease
effects.  The inclusion of prices in our model is intended to capture the evidence reported in
Orlowski (1997). Similarly, labor costs effects are captured by the inclusion of real wages, or past
inflation itself (since unit labor costs are directly linked to inflation), which will be included in our13
estimated model. Since Kazakhstan employed a fixed exchange rate for most of our sample period,
we employ a dummy variable to account for the change in the exchange rate regime in 1999. Finally,
Equation 1 includes both real and nominal variables to explain real exchange rate movements, a
practice consistent with the evidence reported in Dibooglu and Kutan (2001).
To allow for short-run dynamic relationship among the variables, we estimate the following
equation:
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where D stands for the difference operator and k is the lag length. Equation (2) states that real





Monthly data for the period from January 1994 to April 200 is collected from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics, March 2001 CD ROM version. The real exchange rate is
constructed using the U.S. dollar exchange rate and the domestic and foreign (U.S.) price levels.
Although Russia is an important trading partner of Kazakhstan’s, trade contracts are generally
dominated in U.S. dollars, so we rely on a U.S. dollar-based exchange rate to measure the real
exchange rate. The exchange rate is expressed as units of domestic currency per U.S. dollar; an
increase in the real exchange implies a depreciation of the domestic currency. The domestic price
level is represented by the retail price index, while the consumer price index (CPI) is used for the
U.S. price level. The data for real wages are constructed using inflation-adjusted nominal wages.
TOT is the ratio of export prices to import prices.
6 All variables are expressed in logarithmic form.
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monthly data are crosschecked for consistency with the quarterly data, in that the sum of the three-month data and its growth rate
over time match exactly with the corresponding quarterly data. The world oil price data were taken from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics.14
Real Exchange Rate Estimates
Table 3 reports the results for the real exchange rate equation. Note that the variables are in
percentages, since they are expressed in terms of log differences and multiplied by 100. The data are
first-differenced to induce stationarity in order to eliminate spurious regression bias. Unit root test
results (not reported) indicated that the log-levels of the variables are non-stationary but that the
first-differenced data are stationary.
7
 We report the results for the two sub-samples, namely, the full sample and the post-1996
period. The full period includes the effect of initial implementation of macroeconomic policies, while
the 1996-2000 sample corresponds to the post-stabilization period. The full period results may be
sensitive to the relatively high inflation that occurred during 1994-1995 and hence unstable. To
determine the proper lag length, we employed the Akiake’s criterion, with the results supporting a
lag length of four.
8
Two dummy variables are included in the estimated equations to account for the effect of the
Russian crisis in August 1998 and the switch to the floating exchange rate regime in April 1999,
respectively. These variables take the value of unity for the event date and zero otherwise.
The full-period results reported in Table 3 show that the previous period’s changes in TOT
have a significant and positive impact on this period’s real exchange movements. The sign of the
TOT variable is not consistent with theory, however: an improvement in TOT depreciates the
domestic currency. This result may be driven by instability in the data during this period.
9
 Past inflation, both during the previous period and four periods ago, has a significant and
negative impact on the real exchange rate. The combined effect of the two coefficients is about 0.8,
suggesting that a 10% increase in the inflation rate appreciates the real exchange rate by 8%. Real
wage movements significantly influence the real exchange rate with a two-month lag. The impact is
relatively small, however. A 10% increase in the real wages appreciates the real exchange rate by
1.13%. Own lags have no significant affect on the real exchange rate during this period. Finally, the
dummy variables for the Russian crisis and exchange rate regime change are significant and positive,
indicating that they caused about 1.9 and 17.9% depreciations of the tenge, respectively.
The diagnostic tests for the full period results indicate no evidence of serial correlation and
ARCH effects. The adjusted R
2 shows that the estimated model explains about 77% of the variation
                                                       
7 These results are available upon request from the authors.
8 Contemporaneous data are not included in the estimations to prevent any simultaneity bias.
9 Indeed, the CUSUM and CUSUMSO tests indicate instability in the results for the full period while there was no such instability
found for the post-1996 period. For comparison purposes, however, we continue to report the results for both sample periods.15
in the dependant variable. However, as mentioned earlier, CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests indicated
instability in the model. Therefore, these results should be interpreted cautiously.
Turning to the results for the post-1996 period, which is relatively calmer period and
arguably better captures the essence of the post-stabilization period, movements in TOT have now a
significant affect on the real exchange rate with the expected sign. Improvements in TOT bring about
a real appreciation of the tenge. It takes four months for TOT changes to influence the real exchange
rate. A 10% improvement in TOT appreciates the real exchange rate by 2.34%, indicating evidence
of Dutch Disease effects.
Last period’s inflation has a significant and negative effect on the real exchange rate this
period.  A 10 percent increase in the inflation rates appreciates the real exchange rates by 4.17
percent.  Real wage coefficients are significant for lags 2 through 4. The total effect of the real wage
movements sums to about 0.364, suggesting that a 10% increase in the real wage brings about a
3.6% appreciation of the real wage during the post-1996 period. Note that there is significant
persistency in real exchange movements during this period. The combined effect of own lags 1 and 3
is about 0.4, indicating that 40% of movements in today’s real exchange rate is driven by its own
past behavior. In other words, there is significant “memory” in real exchange behavior. Finally, the
dummy variables continue to be significant at the 1% level.
The adjusted R
2
 shows that the model explains about 88% of the variation in the real
exchange rate. The estimated Q and ARCH tests show no significant serial correlation and ARCH
effects of up to 12 lags, respectively. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests (not reported) indicate no
instability in the estimated model for the post-96 period. Thus, the post-1996 results are more robust
and have more explanatory power.
Variance Decompositions
An apparent drawback of the tests in Table 3 is that they are in-sample tests. As a
complement to our analysis, we also report variance decompositions (see Hamilton, 1994; Lütkepohl
and Reimers, 1992) that essentially provide information regarding the 'out-of-sample' causal
structure of the systems. Such tests are powerful in that they provide further evidence about the
significance of independent variables in explaining movements in the dependent variable, including its
own past shocks. Table 4 reports the variance decomposition results for the two periods. Because
the results may be sensitive to the ordering of the variables, we use two alternative orderings, as
shown in Table 3.
The results for the full period show that own lags explain about 68% of the variation in the
real exchange rate. TOT shocks are able to explain about 15-16%, while real wage changes have a16
small share of about 4%. Finally, inflation shocks account for about 12% of the variation. Note that
the results are quite robust to the ordering of the variables.
Looking at the results for the post-1996 period, the most significant change in the results is
the role played by real wages and inflation. The role of inflation in explaining movements in the real
exchange rate becomes minimal compared to the full period, while real wage shocks can now explain
about a quarter of the variation in the real exchange rate. Own lags and TOT shocks continue to be
significant, explaining about 55-61% and 12-17% of the variation in the real exchange rate,
respectively.  These findings support the evidence reported in Table 3.
These results for the post-1996 period are consistent with prior expectations. During this
period, the inflation rate and its effect on the real exchange rate have declined over time as economic
and financial reforms have induced a significant restructuring and change in productivity; this has
allowed real wage rate developments to have a more significant effect on real exchange rate
movements. This finding is also consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson effect, provided that real
wage movements reflect for productivity developments.
10
In sum, the post-1996 period results suggest that there is statistically significant evidence of
Dutch Disease effects in Kazakhstan. We find that improvements in TOT tend to appreciate the real
exchange rate. Although, the variance decompositions results indicate that the impact of TOT shocks
range about between 12 and 17%, depending upon the ordering used, the discussion above suggests
that this effect will likely become larger in the future.
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have examined Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to the Dutch Disease by
estimating a real exchange rate equation that includes the TOT effect. The evidence indicates that
movements in the terms of trade have a significant effect on the real exchange rate with the expected
sign only in the post-1996 period. This finding might be explained by the features of Kazakhstan’s
inherited trade patterns, which remained dominated by Russia and other partners in the
Commonwealth of Independent States during the initial years of the transition. It is more likely that
the effects of the wide swings in the internal value of the ruble, and the timing and pattern of price
and trade liberalization in Russia and other neighboring countries significantly affected the terms of
trade and dominated fluctuations in world oil prices.
                                                       
10 The link from productivity to wages is critical for the Balassa Samuelson effect.  Evidence indicates that this link
exists and strong for transition economies  (Economic Survey of Europe, 2001). Using nine transition countries for the
period from 1991 to 1999, this study finds that the implied long run impact of productivity on real wage is 0.79 at the
industry level. In other words, a 10 percent increase in productivity raises real wages by 7.9 percent.17
The fact that we have find evidence that TOT shocks affect the real exchange rate only in the
post-1996 period may be due in part to a corrective movement away from an initial overvaluation of
the exchange rate. Accordingly, transitory factors may have an impact on the real exchange rate. At
the same time, our results suggest that the Balassa-Samuelson effect may be present in Kazakhstan
through productivity changes and evidence that this is possibly reflected in real wages (Economic
Survey of Europe, 2001). Therefore, a real exchange rate appreciation may be a sign of both
productivity gains and a loss of competitiveness, which is inevitable in the change of the economic
structure. However, it would be unwarranted to interpret our results as suggesting that the real
appreciation in the country was due only to the transitional factors, and that Kazakhstan over the
medium and long term faces no vulnerability to the Dutch Disease. Given that oil will play an even
greater role in the country’s economy and exports in the future (IMF, 2000), the impact of terms of
trade shocks on the real exchange rate of similar magnitude or larger in the future should be
expected. Thus, Dutch Disease-type structural relationships are likely to apply in the future.
Therefore, it is critical that policymakers design appropriate macroeconomic polices to successfully
deal with such issues.18
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TABLE 1
Structure of Exports by Aggregate Commodity Groups (% of total export)
Commodity Group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fuel, oil products 23.8 33.0 34.1 38.1 40.9 52.8
Ferrous metals 19.3 15.8 14.6 14.2 15.8 12.9
Copper and copper products 12.3 9.9 10.8 10.7 10.3 8.1
Inorganic chemicals 7.3 6.8 5.4 5.7 5.8 4.2
Grain 6.7 7.2 7.9 5.4 5.6 5.5
Precious metals 3.0 0.1 2.0 4.6 5.1 4.2
Zinc and zinc products 2.9 2.3 3.4 3.3 2.9 2.2
Ores, slag, and cinders 2.4 2.5 3.8 4.3 2.1 1.9
Reactors, machinery 1.9 2.5 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.0
Others 20.4 19.9 16.3 12.6 10.2 7.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan; calculations of Kazakstan Economic
Trends staff.21
TABLE 2
Real Output Growth (Percentage Change from Previous Year)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Electric power engineering  -4.4 -15.2  -2.8 -10.3 -14.2
Fuel industry -14.8 -14.0 -46.2   3.8   2.3
Ferrous metallurgy -24.4 -29.5  13.5 -17.5  25.3
Non-ferrous metallurgy  -7.8 -22.8   6.3   3.6  13.8
Chemicals and petro-
chemicals
-44.6 -41.1   1.6 -27.0 -29.9
Machine-building -14.7 -38.6 -27.3  -9.2 -29.9
Timber and wood processing  -8.7 -44.9 -40.0 -21.8 -30.5
Construction materials -26.8 -57.1 -29.0 -37.0 -23.7
Light industry -11.7 -44.3 -59.3 -11.3 -24.2
Food industry -13.7 -26.1 -37.5 -24.6  -3.3
Total industry -14.0 -27.5  -8.6   0.3   4.1
Source: IMF (2000).
Note: Starting in 1998 a new classification was introduced; comparable categories are not available
for data prior to 1998.22
                              TABLE 3
Real Exchange Rate Equation Estimates - Dependent Variable: D (log RER)t
Variables           1994:01 – 2000:04 1996:01 – 2000:04
       Constant 0.745 (0.045) ** 0.367 (0.314)
 D (log TOTt-1) 0.483 (0.019) ** 0.132 (0.159)
 D (log TOTt-2) 0.183 (0.209) 0.162 (0.117)
 D (log TOTt-3) 0.001 (0.999) 0.031 (0.729)
 D (log TOTt-4) -0.518 (0.374) -0.234 (0.053) **
      D (log Pt-1) -0.526 (0.019) ** -0.417 (0.044) **
      D (log Pt-2) 0.098 (0.684) 0.018 (0.929)
      D (log Pt-3) 0.166 (0.273) 0.102 (0.561)
      D (log Pt-4) -0.284 (0.016)** -0.056 (0.78)
      D (log RWt-1)    -0.045 (0.781) 0.019 (0.733)
      D (log RWt-2) -0.113 (0.065) ** -0.082 (0.058) ***
D (log RWt-3) -0.020 (0.723) -0.118 (0.056) ***
D (log RWt-4) -0.039 (0.479) -0.164 (0.006) *
D (log RERt-1) -0.009 (0.347) 0.309 (0.000) *
D (log RERt-2) 0.036 (0.741) 0.055 (0.429)
D (log RERt-3) 0.007 (0.922) 0.095 (0.102) ***
D (log RERt-4) -0.115 (0.249) 0.058 (0.417)
Russian Crisis 1.902 (0.007) * 1.463 (0.009) *
Flexible Regime 17.878 (0.000) * 18.719 (0.000) *
Adj. R
2 0.766 0.878
Q (12) 7.374 (0.832) 13.344 (0.345)
ARCH (12) 7.761 (0.803) 15.024 (0.209)
Notes: White heteroskedascity-consistent standard errors are used in all estimations. Q (12) is the test




    1994:01 – 2000:04 1996:01 – 2000:04
Ordering/Variables RER TOT RW P RER TOT RW P
RER, TOT, RW, P 68.5 15.1 4.1 12.2 60.6 11.6 24.0 3.7
TOT, RER, RW, P 67.6 16.1 4.1 12.2 54.8 17.4 24.0 3.7
Notes: Variables refer to the growth rates.  RER = Real Exchange Rate, TOT = Terms of
Trade, RW = Real Wages, and P = Price level. The decompositions are computed using a 12-
month horizon and the reported results refer to the end of 12-month horizon.24
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Figure 2 - Real exchange rate (in log)
Note: The logarithmic of the real exchange rate is defined as follows: log(RER) = log[(E*US
price index)/domestic price index], where the nominal exchange rate, E, is defined in terms of
the units of domestic currency per U.S. dollar. Hence, a decline in the real exchange indicates
the appreciation of the domestic currency.2008
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